All of the regional parties, within and without Afghanistan - are preparing for a withdrawal of US troops.
In this context, jockeying for position in the post US environment is unsurprising. Pakistan would like to check Indian influence; Iran would like to extend its influence and moderate so far as possible the reach and hostility of any Sunni regime in Kabul; ordinary Afghans would like to avoid any problems with post US authorities; and Karzai would like to preserve his own influence despite dissatisfaction with a government that appears corrupt and inept.
There is unlikely to be political support in the US for an indefinite, everlasting commitment to Afghanistan. Moreover, the US interest is not (except as a potential means) in reconstruction of Afghanistan but in denying sanctuary to Al Quaeda, and the US continues to face internal economic difficulties. These factors support the assumption of limited term involvement that all of the regional parties seem to share. The US must, however, continue to deal with Pakistan because (i) of the possibility that instability in Pakistan would lead to an overtly hostile government in control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, (ii) of Pakistan's proximity to, and likely post withdrawal influence in, Afghanistan and (iii) the need to work with Pakistan to directly pressure any remaining Al Quaeda elements there. The "surge" appears to have the limited purpose of positioning elements favorable to the US as well as possible as the regional planning for a US departure takes place.
No comments:
Post a Comment